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Abstract: 
We study the distributional effects of a pollution tax in general equilibrium, with general forms of substitution 
where pollution might be a relative complement or substitute for labor or for capital in production. We find 
closed form solutions for pollution, output prices, and factor prices. Various special cases help clarify the 
impact of differential factor intensities, substitution effects, and output effects. Intuitively, the pollution tax 
might place disproportionate burdens on capital if the polluting sector is capital intensive, or if labor is a better 
substitute for pollution than is capital; however, conditions are found where these intuitive results do not hold. 
We show exact conditions for the wage to rise relative to the capital return. Plausible values are then assigned to 
all the parameters, and we find that variations over the possible range of factor intensities have less impact than 
variations over the possible range of elasticities. 
JEL classification: H23; Q52 
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Article: 
Policy makers need to know the distributional effects of environmental taxes. Previous studies that find 
environmental taxes to be regressive have focused on the uses side of income; that is, how low-income 
consumers use a relatively high fraction of their income to buy gasoline, electricity, and other products that 
involve burning fossil fuel. Yet these studies ignore the sources side of income. Environmental policies can 
have important effects on firms' demands for capital and labor inputs, which can impact the returns to owners of 
capital and labor in a general equilibrium setting. 
 
The literature in public economics contains much work on general equilibrium tax incidence, but the literature 
on environmental taxation has focused mostly on efficiency effects. As reviewed below, neither literature yet 
has studied the general equilibrium incidence of a pollution tax in a model with general forms of substitution. 
Environmental tax incidence has been studied only in partial equilibrium models, in computational general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, or in analytical general equilibrium models with limited forms of substitution. This 
paper provides a theoretical general equilibrium model of the incidence of an environmental tax that allows for 
differential factor intensities and fully general forms of substitution among inputs of labor, capital, and 
pollution. We show incidence on the sources side as well as the uses side. 
 
Many empirical studies provide partial equilibrium analyses of the incidence of an environmental tax. For 
example, Robison (1985) examines the distribution of the costs of pollution abatement from 1973 to 1977 and 
finds regressive burdens equal to 1.09% of the income of the lowest income class and only 0.22% of income for 
the highest income class. Using CGE models, Mayeres (2000) and Metcalf (1999) look at various ways to 
return the revenue from an environmental tax, showing that these distributional effects can more than offset the 
incidence of the environmental tax itself. Morgenstern et al. (2002) discuss four CGE studies that examine 
various distributional effects of carbon policy, but none derive analytical results and none show effects on factor 
prices.
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Previous theoretical work on environmental tax incidence by Rapanos (1992, 1995) models pollution in one 
sector as a negative externality that affects production in the other sector. The model is somewhat restrictive in 
two respects. First, the externality has a specific effect on production in the other sector, which affects 
incidence. Second, Rapanos assumes that pollution bears a fixed relation to output (or to capital input) of the 
polluting sector, so a tax on pollution has the same incidence as a tax on output (or on capital input). In contrast, 
this paper models pollution as a variable input to the dirty sector's production function. In response to any price 
change, the producer can change the mix of labor, capital, and pollution. In particular, pollution can be a 
relative complement or substitute for labor or capital, so that a pollution tax can change the relative demands for 
those other two factors and affect their relative returns. 
 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) examine the efficiency costs of a revenue-neutral environmental tax swap and 
also solve for the change in the wage rate. Their analytical model considers variable pollution, but the 
production function has a single elasticity of substitution among the three inputs (capital, labor, and pollution). 
This formulation does not allow for relative complementarity of inputs in production, a possibility that drives 
significant results below.
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 Chua (2003) presents a model where pollution is a scalar multiple of output, but it 
can be lowered by paying an abatement sector that also uses labor and capital. Because the effect on factor 
prices depends on use of factors in the abatement sector, this model effectively makes some restrictions on the 
ways that firms can substitute out of pollution and into other factors such as labor and capital.
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Our model does not fix pollution as a scalar multiple of output, nor of capital, nor does it posit a third sector for 
abatement. Rather, pollution is modeled as an input along with capital and labor. Minimal restrictions are placed 
on that production function, so that the model is free to consider that any pair of inputs may be complements or 
substitutes. We then solve the model in the style of Harberger (1962) to find closed form solutions for the 
general equilibrium responses to a change in the tax on pollution, in the presence of other taxes. The model 
allows for analyses of a wide variety of policies. 
 
Some of the general results are complex and ambiguous, so special cases are used to provide intuition. In the 
case where the two sectors have equal capital/labor ratios, for example, an increase in the pollution tax 
unambiguously raises the price of the dirty good relative to the clean good. We then show specific conditions 
for the pollution tax to raise or lower the equilibrium wage/rental ratio. Most of these results are intuitive, but 
some are surprising. One might think that the pollution tax raises the relative return of the factor that is the 
better substitute for pollution, but a surprising result is that the opposite holds if labor and capital are highly 
complementary. Then the better substitute for pollution bears proportionally more of the burden of the pollution 
tax. 
 
Another special case allows for differential factor intensities but abstracts from differential substitutability for 
pollution. Normally the pollution tax then lowers the relative return of the factor that is intensively used in the 
dirty sector, but a second surprising result is that the opposite holds if the dirty sector can substitute among its 
inputs more easily than consumers can substitute between outputs. Then the factor that is intensively used in the 
dirty sector bears proportionately less of the burden of the pollution tax. A final unusual result is that although 
the tax withdraws resources from the private economy, one of the factors could actually gain in real terms. We 
provide explanations for these counterintuitive results. 
 
The next section presents the model and uses it to derive a system of equations. Then the second section offers a 
general solution and simplifies it in several cases to interpret the results. While the main contributions here are 
the propositions about incidence, the third section proceeds to insert plausible values for parameters and to 
calculate examples of the incidence of environmental policy. It shows that varying the factor intensities over 
their plausible range has less impact on incidence than varying substitution elasticities over their plausible 
range. The fourth section thus concludes that it is important next to estimate substitution elasticities. This 
concluding section also notes caveats. Indeed, our model could be extended in many of the same ways that the 
original Harberger (1962) model was extended over the following decades.
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1. Model 
The simple model developed here is used to solve for all changes in prices and quantities that result from an 
exogenous change in the pollution tax. No government revenue neutrality is imposed, however, so an increase 
in one tax need not be offset by a decrease in another tax. Instead, as in Harberger (1962) and others, the 
government is assumed to use the increased revenue to purchase the two private goods in the same proportion as 
do households. Thus, the transfer from the private sector to the public sector has no effect on relative demands 
or on prices. We consider a competitive two-sector economy using two factors of production, capital and labor. 
Both factors are mobile and can be used by either sector. A third variable input is pollution, Z, necessary to 
produce one of the outputs. The constant returns to scale production functions are: 
 
where X is the "clean" good, Y is the "dirty" good, KX and KY are capital used in each sector, and LX and LY are 
labor used in each sector.
5
 The resource constraints are: 
 
where    and    are the fixed total amounts of capital and labor in the economy. Totally differentiating these two 
constraints yields: 
 
where a hat denotes a proportional change (  X ≡ dKX/KX) and λij denotes sector j' s share of factor 
i (e.g. λKX≡KX/  ). Notice that Z has no equivalent resource constraint and is simply a choice of the dirty 
sector.
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 To ensure finite use of pollution in the initial equilibrium, we start with a preexisting positive tax on 
pollution.
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Producers of X can substitute between factors in response to changes in the gross-of-tax factor prices pL and pK, 
according to an elasticity of substitution in production σX. The definition of σX is differentiated and rearranged 
to obtain the firm's response,   X −   X = σX(  L −   K), where σX is defined to be positive. The firm's cost of 
capital can be written as pK = r(1 +τK), where r is the net return to capital and τK is the ad valorem rate of tax on 
capital. Similarly, pL = w(1 +τL), where w is the net wage and τL is the labor tax.
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 Here, the only tax change is in 
the pollution tax, so   L = ŵ and   K =   . Substituting these into the σX expression yields: 
 
The choice of inputs in sector Y is more complicated, since it has three inputs. First, note that firms face no 
market price for pollution except for a tax, so pZ= τZ (and   Z=   Z, where   Z= dτZ/τZ). 
 
This tax per unit of pollution is a specific tax rather than an ad valorem tax. We then follow Mieszkowski 
(1972) in modeling the choices among three inputs. To do this, define eij as the Allen elasticity of substitution 
between inputs i and j (Allen, 1938). This elasticity is positive when the two inputs are substitutes and is 
negative when they are complements. Note that eij= eji, that eii ≤ 0, and that at most one of the three cross-price 
elasticities can be negative.
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 Also, define θYK ≡ r(1+τK)KY/pYY as the share of sales revenue from Y that is paid 
to capital (and similarly define θYL, θXK,
 and
 θXL). Note that θYZ ≡ τZZ/pYY is the share of revenue of sector Y 
that is paid for pollution, through taxes. Also note that θXK + θXL = 1 and θYK + θYL + θYZ = 1. Then, as shown in 
the Appendix:
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Using assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, where pX and pY are output prices, the 
Appendix also derives the following two equations: 
 
Totally differentiate each sector's production function and substitute in the conditions from the perfect 
competition assumption shown in the Appendix to yield: 
 
Finally, consumer preferences for the two goods can be modeled using σu, the elasticity of substitution between 
goods X and Yin utility. Differentiate the definition of σu to get the equation for consumer demand response to a 
change in prices:
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This formulation does not preclude disutility from pollution. Rather, it just assumes that pollution (or 
environmental quality) is separable in utility. For an alternative, Carbone and Smith (2006) model the non-
separability of air quality and leisure. 
 
Eqs. (1)—(10) are ten equations in eleven unknowns (  X,   Y,   X,   Y,  ,   ,   X,   ,   Y,   ,   ). Good X is chosen 
as numeraire, so   X = 0.
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 This system of ten equations then provides solutions to all ten unknown endogenous 
changes as functions of parameters and of an exogenous positive change in the pollution tax (  Z >  0). If the 
pollution tax is reduced, then all results hold with the opposite sign. 
 
Our primary purpose is to solve for incidence results, i.e., the effects on output prices and factor prices. Thus, to 
make the solution more manageable, we omit equations for the proportional changes in quantities   X,   Y,   X, 
  Y,   , and Ŷ. We keep the proportional change in pollution,   , since that result is of interest as well, though it is 
a quantity and not a price. 
 
2. Results and interpretations 
The Appendix shows how to use Eqs. (1)—(10) above to find the following general solutions for an increase in 
τZ, the pollution tax rate:
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While the interpretation of this general solution is limited by its complexity, some basic effects can be 
identified. For example, the last term in (11b) or (11c) is (γK− γL)σu, which Mieszkowski (1967) calls the 
"output effect": a tax on emissions is a tax only in the dirty sector and therefore reduces output (in a way that 
depends on consumer demand via σu). Less output means less demand for all inputs, but particularly the input 
used intensively in that sector. The term (γK− γL) is positive when the dirty sector is capital-intensive. Then, 
assuming D>0, the output effect places relatively more burden on capital. Whether this intuitive results hold 
depends on the sign of the denominator D, however, and this complicated expression can have either sign in this 
general solution. 
 
Furthermore, the first two terms in Eqs. (11b) or (11c) represent "substitution effects". As pollution become 
more costly, the dirty sector seeks to adjust its demand for all three inputs. How it does so is determined by the 
Allen elasticities of substitution, which figure prominently in those first two terms. The constants A and B also 
come into play, weighing the impact of the elasticities on the incidence results. These constants can be signed, 
but their magnitudes are complicated functions of the factor share parameters, making an interpretation difficult 
from these general solutions alone. 
 
Thus, while several effects are at work, their combination and interactions are quite difficult to analyze in these 
equations. We therefore isolate each effect by assuming away the other effects in a series of special cases. 
Although A> 0, B> 0, and C> 0, the denominator D cannot be signed, and so nothing definitive can be said yet 
about the effect of the pollution tax on the output price (11a), factor prices (11b) and (11c), or even on the 
amount of pollution (11d). In fact, an increase in the pollution tax might increase pollution.
14
 Thus the following 
special cases are also useful to seek definitive results.
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Before proceeding, consider implications for who bears the burden of this tax. The interpretation of ŵ =   = 0 is 
not that factors bear no burden, but that burdens are proportional to their shares of national income. Labor is 
unaffected by the tax on the sources side if the real wage does not change, ŵ −   = 0, where the overall price 
index is p ≡ υpX + (1−υ)pY, and where υ is the share of total expenditure on X. Of course, pX is numeraire, but 
pY may rise. And this discussion presumes that both factors spend similarly on the two goods; on the uses side, 
if pY rises, the tax places more burden on anybody who spends more than the average fraction of income on the 
polluting good. 
 
2.1. Case 1: Equal factor intensities 
First, consider the case where both industries have the same factor intensities, that is, both are equally capital 
(and labor) intensive. This amounts to setting γL and γK equal to each other. Let their common value be γ, and 
note that this condition implies that LY/LX = KY/KX. In this case, the solution to the system of equations is: 
 
 
 
 
It is also of interest and quite counterintuitive to note when the above proposition does not hold. If the value of 
D1 is negative, then the results are exactly the opposite. 
 
Proposition 1C. In Case 1, but where Condition 1 does not hold,   > 0 and    < 0 if and only if eLZ<eKZ. 
 
Proof. D1 < 0, and Eqs. (12b) and (12c). ❑ 
Normally with eLZ < eKZ, we would say that capital is a better substitute for pollution, so the pollution tax would 
tend to increase demand for capital and hence to increase r. This effect is more than offset, however, when eKL 
is sufficiently negative (Condition 1 does not hold). Capital and labor are complementary inputs, and the 
increased demand for capital also leads to an increased demand for labor. With a sufficiently high degree of 
complementarity, this effect dominates, and w increases relative to r. While we would not necessarily expect 
this case to be common, it demonstrates a perverse possibility: even when both sectors have equal factor 
intensities, the better substitute for pollution can bear more of the burden of a tax on pollution. 
 
The top half of Fig. 1 summarizes Case 1:   Y is always positive, but the signs of   and   depend on whether 
Condition 1 holds, and on whether eLZ < eKZ. On the knife's edge where eLZ = eKZ is a special case of Case 1 that 
we label Case 2. 
 
2.2. Case 2: Equal factor intensities and eKZ = eLZ 
In addition to equal factor intensities (γK = γL = γ), suppose also that capital and labor are equally good 
substitutes for pollution (eLZ=eKZ). In this special case, we have: 
 
Proof. Eqs. ((12a) (12b) (12c) (12d)), substituting in eKZ = eLZ. ❑ 
For factor prices, as in Case 1, equal factor intensities eliminate the output effect of Mieszkowski (1967). The 
additional assumption of equal substitution elasticities in Case 2 eliminates his substitution effect. Without 
either of these effects, the change in tax has no effect on the relative prices of capital and labor. Thus, neither 
factor bears a disproportionate burden. Next, the effect on the price of the dirty good is the same as in Case 1. 
More interesting in this case is that we can finally sign the effect on pollution. 
 
Proposition 2B. In Case 2,    < 0. 
 
Proof. In Eq. (13), note that eZZ ≤ 0, eLZ ≥ 0, and that all of the other parameters are positive.
17
 ❑  
The purpose of this example is to reduce the general model to the simple model where Y has only two inputs, 
and where τZ is said to have two effects that both reduce pollution. 
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 The "substitution effect" is the second 
term in the numerator of (13), where τZ increases the relative price of pollution, which reduces pollution per unit 
output. The "output effect" is the first term in (13), where τZ increases the price of output, which reduces total 
demand. Thus, pollution is definitely reduced by the tax on pollution. Somewhat surprisingly, this intuitive 
result does not hold in general (see Footnote 14). 
 
2.3. Case 3: Fixed input proportions (eij = 0) 
By eliminating factor intensity differences, the special cases above concentrate on the signs of input demand 
elasticities. Now we eliminate the differential effects of input demand elasticities in order to concentrate on 
relative factor intensities (γK − γL). If this value is positive, then industry Y is capital-intensive. 
 
We start with the simplest way to eliminate differential elasticities by assuming that all eij = 0 (but this is a 
special case of Case 4 below, a less restrictive way to eliminate differences). We now expect no substitution 
effect, but only the output effect arising from the implicit tax on Y associated with an increase in the tax on 
pollution. This absence of a substitution effect is precisely what materializes in the solution: 
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where D3 =CσX - (γK - γL)σu(ӨXKӨYL
 —
 ӨXLӨYK). It can be shown that (γK - γL) and (ӨXKӨYL — ӨXLӨYK)  
always have opposite sign, so D3 > 0. Thus, just as in cases above, the price of the dirty good relative  
to the clean good increases unambiguously in response to an increase in the tax on pollution (  Y > 0). 
 
More interesting is the effect on the relative return to labor and capital. The sign of each of those two changes is 
based only on the relative factor intensities of the two industries, γK— γL. We can write this conclusion as the 
following: 
 
Proposition 3. In Case 3, if Y is capital-intensive, then   > 0 and   < 0. 
 
Proof. Eqs. (14b) and (14c), since D3 > 0, and Y being capital-intensive means γK— γL > 0. ❑ 
The interpretation is solely in terms of the output effect for sector Y. Because of fixed input proportions (eij=0), 
a pollution tax increase is equivalent to a tax on output Y and leads to decreased output of that good. Therefore, 
sector Y demands less labor and less capital. If Y is capital-intensive, then the fall in demand for capital exceeds 
the fall in demand for labor, and hence r falls relative to w. This simple case helps establish the presumption for 
the more surprising result of the next section. 
 
2.4. Case 4: Equal elasticities of factor demand 
To abstract from differential input demand elasticities, it is not necessary to suppose that all are zero. A less 
restrictive way to do this is to suppose that all of the own-price Allen elasticities eii are equal to a1 ≤ 0 and that 
all of the cross-price elasticities, eij for i  j, are equal to a2 ≥ 0.
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 Furthermore, define α = (a2 - a1)>_0. (Then 
Case 3 is the special case where α = a2 = a1 = 0.) The more general solution then is: 
 
As in the other special cases, the sign of the change in the price of the dirty good relative to the price of the 
clean good is unambiguous. 
Proposition 4A. In Case 4,   Y > 0. 
 
Proof. Since (θYKθXL
—
 θYLθXK) has the same sign as (γK— γL), and D4 > 0, the coefficient in Eq. (15a) is 
positive. ❑ 
We can now interpret the changes in factor prices in terms of an output effect and substitution effect in the 
polluting industry. The sign of the change in factor prices in (15b) and (15c) depends the signs of (γK— γL) and 
(σu—θYZα). The former is positive when Y is capital-intensive. In the latter, α is a measure of the overall ability 
of firms in sector Y to substitute among inputs. It is equal to eij - eii, so a larger α means easier substitution away 
from the more costly input (eii < 0) and into the other inputs (eij >0). Also, σu represents the ability of consumers 
to substitute between X and Y. Thus, in combination, the expression (σu - θYZα) represents whether it is 
relatively easier for consumers to substitute between goods X and Y than for producers of Y to substitute among 
their three inputs K, L, and Z. This interpretation leads to the following proposition about an increase in the 
pollution tax τZ: 
 
Proposition 4B. In Case 4, when sector Y is capital intensive, then ŵ > 0 and   < 0 whenever σu > θYZα. When 
sector Y is labor intensive, then ŵ < 0 and    >0 whenever σu > θYZα. 
 
Proof. Eqs. (15b) and (15c), since D4 > 0. ❑ 
To explain,   Z > 0 induces a substitution effect for producers of Y that increases demand for K and could be 
expected to increase r. In addition, however, the output effect raises the price of Y and reduces production. 
When Y is capital intensive, this output effect reduces overall demand for capital and would tend to decrease r. 
These two effects work in opposite directions. If σu > θYZα, then the output effect dominates the substitution 
effect and less capital is demanded by sector Y. When sector Y is capital-intensive, its reduced demand for 
capital outweighs sector X's increased use, and the economy-wide r/w falls. Hence the result in Proposition 4B. 
 
This proposition includes both the intuitive result above and the reverse counterintuitive result: abstracting from 
different cross-price elasticities, capital intensity in the dirty industry can lead to a disproportionately high 
burden of the pollution tax on labor rather than on capital .
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 Again, capital intensity of Y has two opposite 
effects. On the one hand, it reduces r through the output effect, since consumers demand less of the capital-
intensive good. However, σu < θYZα means that the effect is relatively small. The larger substitution effect 
means that firms are trying to substitute out of Z and into both K and L. The firms in Y want to increase both 
factors in proportion to their own use, which is capital-intensive, but they must get that capital from X, which is 
labor intensive. They can only get that extra capital by bidding up its price. 
 
The bottom half of Fig. 1 summarizes all of these results for Case 4, as well as its special case where all eij = 0 
(Case 3). 
 
2.5. Case 5: All equal cross-price substitution elasticities 
A final special case can help with intuition and relate our model to other models in the literature. Here, we 
impose no constraints on factor intensities but suppose that σu and all cross-price substitution elasticities have 
the same value (σu=eKL=eKZ=eLZ=c, some positive constant).
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 We then have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5A. In Case 5, regardless of factor intensities, then ŵ = 0,   = 0,   Y= θYZ  Z, and   = -  Z. 
 
Proof. Substitute c into all of Eqs. (11a) (11b) (11c) (11d). ❑ 
It is interesting that these results are similar to those of Case 2 even though Case 2 employs different 
assumptions (equal factor intensities and eKZ=eLZ). Instead, this case with equal substitution elasticities is almost 
Cobb–Douglas, but a smaller elasticity c < 1 implies that the tax τZ has less effect on pollution. It can be shown 
that Cobb–Douglas production in the Y sector means eKL=eKZ=eLZ=1 and eii=(θYi − 1)/θYi for each input i. 
Cobb-Douglas utility means σu=1. Then, with these assumptions, we have: 
 
Proposition 5B. If utility and production of Yare Cobb–Douglas, then ŵ = 0,   = 0,   Y= θYZ  Z, and    = -  Z. 
Proof. Substitute c=1 into Proposition 5A. ❑ 
This Cobb–Douglas case is worth stating explicitly because of its clear intuition. Consumers spend a constant 
fraction of income on Y, and the firms in Y spend a constant fraction of sales revenue to pay for pollution. 
Thus, total spending τZZ is constant. Then any increase in the pollution tax implies the same percent fall in 
pollution and no effect on any other factor of production. In fact, the price pY rises by the same percentage that 
the quantity Y falls. 
 
3. Numerical analysis 
To explore the likely size of these effects, we now assign plausible values to parameters. The goal here is not to 
calculate a point estimate for effects of a pollution tax on pollution and factor prices, as this model is too simple 
for that purpose. Rather, the goal is to examine numerically the theoretical effects derived above, to see the 
direction of changes in these outcomes from changes in key parameters. We therefore vary the factor intensities 
and substitution elasticities. Other parameters are chosen to approximate the current U.S. economy or to match 
estimates in the available literature. Although many of these parameters have not been estimated in the form 
required here, other structural models may be similar enough to use their parameter values in our model. 
 
For a definition of the ―dirty‖ sector, we use the top thirteen polluting industries by SIC 2-digit codes from the 
EPA's Toxic Release Inventory for 2002.
23
 All other industries are deemed ―clean‖ for present purposes. We 
then use industry-level data on labor and capital employed in the U.S., from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
24
 
When we add labor and capital across industries within each sector, we find that the 13 most polluting 
industries represent about 20% of factor income. Therefore, our first ―stylized fact‖ is that the clean sector is 
80% of income. Using the same data, we find that the capital share of factor income is .3985 in the clean sector 
and .4105 in the dirty sector.
25
 Thus the dirty sector is slightly capital-intensive, as consistent with prior findings 
(e.g. Antweiler et al., 2001, p. 879). The difference is quite small, however, and we wish to avoid the perception 
that we are trying to calculate incidence with such precision. Appropriate rounding suggests that the capital 
share in both sectors is about 40%, and so that is the second stylized fact used here (as a starting point, before 
sensitivity analysis).
26 
 
In the clean sector, the implication is that θXK is 0.40, and θXL is 0.60 (so K/L is 2/3). In the dirty sector, 
however, these data on labor and capital do not help determine the fraction of output attributed to the value of 
pollution (θYZ). This parameter is not in available data, since most industries do not pay an explicit price for 
pollution. For most pollutants in most industries, this value is implicit – a shadow value, or scarcity rent. 
Therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, we set θYZ to 0.25, and so our third ―stylized fact‖ is that the dirty industry 
spends 25% of its sales revenue on the pollution input.
27
 For the remaining 75% to have the same K/L ratio as 
the clean sector, θYK must be 0.30, and θYL must be 0.45. In fact, given various equations of the model, the three 
―stylized facts‖ are enough to determine all of the remaining parameters shown in Table 1.
28 
 
No empirical estimates of substitution parameters are available specifically for our definition of the dirty sector. 
The clean sector is 80% of factor income, however, so an economy-wide estimate represents a decent 
approximation of σX for the clean sector. Lovell (1973) and Corbo and Meller (1982) estimate the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor for all manufacturing industries. They find an elasticity of unity, which 
we employ for σX. 29 We also use unity for the elasticity of substitution in consumption between the clean and 
dirty goods, σu.
30 
 
The only further parameters needed are the eij input demand elasticities in the dirty sector. The model includes 
six of these parameters, but only three can be set independently.
31
 Therefore, we vary only the three cross-price 
elasticities, which effectively sets the other parameters. To the best of our knowledge, these cross-price 
elasticities have never been estimated with inputs defined as labor, capital, and pollution. 
32
 We therefore allow 
them to take alternative values of —1, —1 /2, 0, 1/2, and 1. As these parameters vary, we consider the 
implications for the results (  Y,  ,   ,   ). 
 
 
In performing these calculations, we always use a 10% increase in pollution tax. Table 2 allows the Allen 
elasticities eKZ and eLZ to vary, holding constant the factor intensities. 
33
 Notice in the first column of results that 
the change in pollution is always negative, but the magnitude of the change varies drastically in a way that 
depends on the two varied parameters. The smallest change in pollution occurs when both of those parameters 
are zero (   = —.0200 in row 2), but it is also small whenever the two are of opposite signs (e.g. row 1 or 5). 
The change in pollution is larger when both are positive, and it is largest in the Cobb—Douglas case where all 
three cross-price Allen elasticities are equal to one (row 12). As consistent with Proposition 5B, this row shows 
   = -  Z. 
 
The changes in the wage rate and capital rental rate in the next two columns of Table 2 are always small, no 
more than about a half of a percent in either direction. The increase in output price is more substantial, always 
2.5%. This result is no coincidence. With equal factor intensities, the simple result of Case 1 and Eq. (12a) is 
  Y= θYZ  Z. Thus, the 10% increase in τZ always raises the output price by 2.5%. 
 
The primary purpose of Table 2 is to illustrate the effects of different cross-price elasticities, as in Case 1 where 
both sectors have the same factor intensities. Indeed, since eKL=1 satisfies Condition 1, the table reflects 
Proposition 1B where the pollution tax always imposes more burden on the relative complement to pollution. 
That is, labor bears more burden (ŵ <0) in rows such as 3-4 where eKZ > eLZ, and capital bears more burden (  < 
0) in rows like 5-6 where eKZ < eLZ. When neither is a relative complement (eKZ=eLZ), both are burdened equally 
as in Proposition 2A (rows 2, 7, and 12). 
 
Can all of the burden on the sources side be shifted from one factor to the other? For either factor to bear none 
of the burden, or to gain, its return would have to rise by more than the overall price index p  υpX+(1—υ)pY, 
where υ=0.75 is the share of expenditure on X. When   Y=0.025, the change in this price index   =.00625. In 
Table 2, the largest   is 0.00341 (row 9), just over half of that price increase. In other words, labor can avoid 
"most" of the burden when the pollution tax induces the firm to use more labor (eLZ=1) and less capital      
(eKZ=-.5). The last two columns of Table 2 show that ŵ —   < 0 and   -   < 0 for all parameters considered 
here, so both factors bear some burden. Yet one factor could gain if elasticity differences were greater.
34
 
 
In the next table, we consider the impact of changes in factor intensities (with unchanging elasticities). We 
cannot just set the cross-price elasticities equal to each other, however, because then Proposition 2A says we get 
no effects on factor prices. Instead, all rows of Table 3 assume eLZ=1 and eKZ=−.5 (as in row 9 of Table 2, with 
the largest effects on factor prices). Then, with those elasticities fixed, we vary the factor intensities. The first 
column shows γK− γL, which is positive if the dirty sector is capital intensive. We vary this value from −0.25 to 
0.25, which effectively changes the "data" of the initial economy. We then calculate new parameters λ and θ 
that are consistent with each other (and with a fixed overall size of each sector X and Y and fixed resource 
quantities    and   ). The second column shows corresponding increases in θYK from 0.15 to 0.44 (and row 6 
shows prior results with θYK= 0.30 and θXK= 0.40). 
 
The first five rows of Table 3 illustrate how labor can bear less than its share of the burden, even though the 
dirty sector is labor intensive, because labor is a better substitute for pollution. As the polluting sector is 
changed from labor intensive to capital intensive, the pollution tax burden is shown to shift even more onto 
capital. The fall in the rental rate enlarges from 0.22% to 0.83%. The change in the wage is always positive, 
because labor is the better substitute for pollution, but   rises from 0.0018 to 0.0045 as the dirty sector becomes 
more capital-intensive. In this last row labor avoids "most" of the burden, with ŵ= 0.0045 relative to   = 
0.00625, but labor still cannot avoid all of the burden — even in this combination where labor is a better 
substitute for pollution and the dirty sector is very capital intensive. 
 
In general, the factor intensities of the two sectors are better estimated than are the Allen elasticities of 
substitution. In Table 3, the factor intensities are varied over a range that is much wider than the range of 
possible estimates, and still the proportional change in the wage rate varies by only 0.0027 (from 0.0018 to 
0.0045). In contrast, Table 2 varies the cross-price Allen elasticities only from − 0.5 to 1.0, a range that is less 
wide than the range of possible estimates, and  ŵ varies by more than twice as much (by 0.0068, from − 0.0034 
to +0.0034). Thus, for the incidence of the pollution tax, we conclude that the impact of factor intensities over 
the plausible range is less important than the impact of the elasticities of substitution between pollution and 
capital or labor. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Using a simple general equilibrium model of production with pollution, this paper has found the incidence of a 
pollution tax on the prices of outputs and on the returns to inputs. We present the system of equations that can 
be solved for the incidence of any tax on capital, labor, output, or pollution. A small increase in the pollution tax 
rate alters the return to labor relative to capital in a way that depends on the substitutability of labor for 
pollution, the substitutability of capital for pollution, and the relative factor intensities of the two sectors. When 
both sectors are equally capital-intensive and capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor, then 
intuitively we expect the return to capital to rise relative to the wage. If labor and capital are highly comple-
mentary, however, then this intuitive result does not hold. 
 
Another surprising result is in the case where both factors are equally substitutable for pollution. In that case, 
the pollution tax can increase the return to capital even when the polluting sector is more capital-intensive than 
the other sector, if consumers are less able to substitute among goods than producers of the dirty good are able 
to substitute among their inputs. 
 
Numerically, it is shown that the elasticities of substitution in production between capital and pollution and 
between labor and pollution have an important effect on the incidence of a pollution tax. The impact of the 
uncertainty about substitution elasticities outweighs the impact of the uncertainty about factor intensities. 
 
These results provide evidence that the substitutability of capital, labor, and emissions has very important 
consequences for environmental policy, and that more work needs to be done in estimating these parameters 
and analyzing their effects. Not only do these elasticities affect tax incidence, as shown in the main results of 
this paper, they affect the impact of environmental policy on the environment itself. For alternative parameter 
values used here, a 10% increase in the pollution tax rate reduces pollution anywhere from 2% to 10%. For 
extreme parameter values, it can lead to more pollution. 
 
Further research could extend in many directions. First, any of the simplifying assumptions of our model could 
be relaxed to see how results are affected by alternative assumptions such as: imperfect factor mobility, 
adjustment costs, imperfect competition, non-constant returns to scale, international trade in goods or factors, 
tax evasion, or uncertainty. In many cases, the results of such extensions can be predicted from the literature 
that followed the original article by Harberger (1962). In a model with perfect international capital mobility, for 
example, the net return to capital is fixed by world capital markets, and so the pollution tax cannot place a 
burden on capital — in contrast to the results here for effects on the wage and capital return in a closed 
economy. 
 
Another direction for further research is to calculate the effects of these price changes on different income 
groups (or regions, or racial groups). With data on the labor and capital income of each group, our results for   
and   could be used to calculate the effect of a pollution tax on the sources of income for each group. With 
additional data on the expenditures, our results for   Y could be used to calculate the effect on the uses side. 
Finally, our analytical model could be extended to a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model with more 
factors, sectors, and groups. 
 
Still, the model in this paper provides the first theoretical analysis of the incidence and distributional effects of 
environmental policy that allows for fully general forms of substitution among factors and that solves for all 
general equilibrium effects of the pollution tax. The analytical model is used to derive general propositions that 
do not depend upon the particular parameter values that must be used in a CGE model. Our model also is used 
to identify the crucial parameters. In particular, we show how differential substitution between factors can 
greatly affect the burdens of a pollution tax. 
 
Notes: 
1
 Also, West and Williams (2004) use micro data to model demand equations and empirically estimate the 
distribution of burdens of environmental policy. Parry (2004) examines the distribution of the scarcity rents 
created by grandfathered emissions permits. In a model with unemployment, Wagner (2005) shows that an 
emissions tax can help labor to the extent that it stimulates employment in the abatement sector. 
2
 DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) allow for complementarity of inputs, and they derive the change in the wage 
rate, but their model is primarily used to examine the efficiency of revenue-neutral tax swaps. To the extent that 
they examine incidence, their results are somewhat limited by the fact that capital either has an exogenous price 
or is supplied in elastically in the polluting industry. 
3
 McAusland (2003) develops a theoretical model to examine the role of inequality in endogenous 
environmental policy choice, and Aidt (1998) explores how heterogeneous agents may influence environmental 
policy through political processes. While both models are concerned with inequality, neither is strictly an 
examination of the incidence of environmental policy. Likewise, Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) 
consider the efficiency costs of environmental taxation under a distributional constraint.
 
4 See McLure (1975) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for summaries of these extensions. 
5
 As is typical in environmental models, the second production function includes pollution as an input. This is 
simply a rearrangement of a production function where both Y and Z are functions of KY and LY.
 
6
 For example, one could say that pollution Z arises from the incomplete transformation of an unmodeled input 
that has a flat supply curve, and that the associated pollution has no cost other than τZ.
 
7
 This problem could also be solved by introducing a private cost of pollution, separate from the tax (see 
Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001). Here, we merely assume that the initial tax is positive and hence examine a 
change in the pollution tax rate rather than the introduction of a pollution tax.
 
8
 Differentiating the price equations yields   K=   +   K and   L = ŵ+  L, where   K=dτK/(1+τK) and   L=dτL/(1+τL). 
The model could be used to vary these tax rates and thus to analyze their incidence. Alternatively, it could be 
used with a revenue-neutrality constraint, so that an increase in the pollution tax is offset by a decrease in some 
other tax. In this paper, however, we hold these taxes constant (  K=   L=0). 
9
 Stability conditions in Allen (1938) require that eii are strictly negative. Yet we can solve for the Leontief case 
where all eij = 0 below, so we only require eii ≤ 0.
 
10
 In a sense, we could avoid saying that pollution is an "input" to the production function Y=Y(KY, LY, Z) and 
instead just specify Eqs. (4) and (5). In that case, the Allen elasticities of substitution are a direct way to model 
the choices of firms. A higher tax on pollution leads firms to pollute less (eZZ<0), holding output constant, and it 
may raise or lower use of labor or capital in ways that depend on the signs and magnitudes of eLZ and eKZ. The 
only necessary point is that these reactions affect the incidence of the tax.
 
11
 Our model also includes output taxes τX and τY. Thus, in general,   − Ŷ= σu(  Y +   Y −   X −   X), but this paper 
holds these tax rates constant (  X =   Y =   K =   L = 0). These other taxes are still in the model, however, since 
firms and consumers in the initial equilibrium are responding to cum-tax prices. Since the levels of those tax 
rates do not appear in solutions below, it means that the effects of   Z > 0 do not depend on the level of other 
existing tax rates. 
12
 Harberger (1962) chose w as numeraire and interpreted the expression for dr as the change in the return to 
capital relative to labor. In this model, we provide expressions for both ŵ and   . These results can be compared 
to those of Harberger by considering the value of   − ŵ. 
13
 If solely in terms of exogenous parameters, the expression for    would be long. The three preceding 
equations can be substituted into the fourth to get that closed-form solution, as done in special cases below.
 
14
 DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) obtain a similar perverse result. In our model, it is possible with certain 
extreme parameter values. For a case that satisfies all restrictions from Allen (1938), suppose λKX=0.2, λLX= 0.1, 
θXK=0.9, θYK=0.72, θYZ=0.1, eKL=2, eKZ=−1, eLZ=5, eZZ = −1.8, and σu=σX=1. The increase in pZ has a direct 
effect that reduces pollution (since eZZ=−1.8) but a larger indirect effect that raises pollution. The 10% higher pZ 
decreases demand for capital (eKZ=−1), which decreases the rate of return (  = −.0025). It also increases 
demand for labor (eLZ=5). This labor is hard to get from the other sector X, which is small and capital-intensive, 
so w rises steeply (  = .0223). Both of these factor price changes have positive feedback effects on pollution, 
since the fall in r raises Z (eZK=−1), and the rise in w raises Z (eZL=5). The net result is 0.197% more emissions. 
This result depends on the fixed supply of labor and capital, however; if either factor supply were endogenous, 
   > 0 would be less likely. 
15
 A very special case of this model reduces exactly to the model in Harberger (1962), even for his analysis of a 
partial tax on capital. In our model, when capital and pollution are perfect complements in production of Y, then 
a tax on pollution is a partial factor tax on capital (as in Rapanos, 1992). 
16
 Note that the change in the wage rate always has the opposite sign as the change in the rental rate. This 
follows directly from the choice of X as numeraire and the zero-profit Eq. (6). This relationship need not hold 
for other choices of numeraire. Only the relative change in the returns to capital and labor is of interest here, 
and this value is independent of the choice of numeraire.
 
17
 In general, eLZ could be positive or negative, but here where eLZ=eKZ, the fact that eZZ ≤ 0 implies that eLZ=eKZ 
≥ 0. 
18
 The substitution and output effects here refer to effects on pollution (whereas elsewhere we use these terms to 
mean Mieszkowski's (1967) effects of taxes on factor prices). To reduce the model to only two inputs, we could 
add the assumptions eKL=σX=0; then L and K are used in fixed proportions and can be considered a single 
composite input. Sector X uses only this clean input, with no ability to substitute. Sector Y has effectively only 
two inputs between which it can substitute: one is pollution and the other is this clean input. The results with 
these assumptions are identical to the results in Case 2, however, so we do not need to say whether eKL=σX=0. 
19
 The expression for    can be evaluated using the other three expressions, but it is not included here because it 
does not prove illuminating.
 
20
 Our Appendix discusses restrictions demonstrated by Allen (1938). Since eii cannot be positive, Case 4 
assumes that the matrix of eij has a1 ≤ 0 down the diagonal and a2 ≥ 0 everywhere else. 
21
 This result is reminiscent of Harberger's (1962) result that the partial tax on capital can hurt labor.
 
22
 This case is analyzed, for example, by Harberger (1962) in his section VI, part 10. 
23
 The top 13 polluters are those with at least 120,000,000 lb of on- and off-site reported releases of all 
chemicals monitored by the TRI (nearly 650 listed at http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical/index.htm). These 
industries are metal mining, electric utilities, chemicals, primary metals, fabricated metals, food, paper, plastics, 
transportation equipment, petroleum, stone/clay/glass, lumber, and electrical equipment. These data are publicly 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ triexplorer/industry.htm. Although the dividing line between clean and dirty 
industries is arbitrary, changes in this line do not yield much change in parameters. 
24
 Available online at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html.
 
25
 These values are also consistent with other literature. The capital share is similar across studies, though again 
no study considers clean industries only. Griliches and Mairesse (1998) conclude that the capital share is 
approximately 0.4, and Blundell and Bond (2000) use GMM to yield an estimate of approximately 0.3, which 
rises to 0.45 when constant returns to scale is imposed. 
26
 Other definitions of the dirty sector might yield more divergent factor intensities. If it includes only utilities 
and chemicals, for example, then capital is 55% of factor income. Also, however, that dirty sector is only 8% of 
the economy. In that case we found very small changes in w and r, and so those results are not so interesting. A 
general equilibrium model is not necessary when the taxed sector is small. 
27
 This choice for θYZ is arbitrary, and not really a stylized ―fact‖, but appropriate data are not available. It 
would be underestimated using data from an emissions permit market such as the one in place for sulfur dioxide 
from electric utilities, since most pollutants are restricted by mandates rather than permits or taxes. If 
shareholders own the right to emit a restricted amount of any pollutant, then they earn a scarcity rent that we 
would characterize as the return pZZ. In available data, this return might appear as part of the normal return to 
capital of the shareholders. In effect, then, we suppose that existing pollution restrictions and shadow prices are 
first converted to their equivalent explicit tax rates τZ. We then evaluate marginal effects of environmental 
policy by calculating the effects of a small increase in that pollution tax. 
28
 We define a unit of any input or output such that all initial prices are one (pX=pY=pK=pL=pZ=1). Then zero 
profit conditions imply X=KX+LX and Y=KY+LY+Z. We consider an economy with total factor income equal to 
one (which could be in billions or trillions). Then KX+KY+LX+LY= 1, and factor shares in each industry are 
enough to determine all λ and θ values. 
29
 In a more recent paper estimating this parameter, Claro (2003) finds elasticities of approximately 0. 8, which 
is close to one. Babiker et al. (2003) also use σX=1 in their computational model. 
30
 This is the same initial value used by Fullerton and Metcalf (2001). Little evidence exists on the substitution 
in utility between goods produced using pollution and those produced otherwise. 
31
 The Appendix defines aij=θYjeij, where the parameters must satisfy aiL+aiK+aiZ=0 for all i. 
32
 Humphrey and Moroney (1975) estimate Allen elasticities using capital, labor, and natural resource products. 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) use estimates of elasticities between labor, capital, energy, and materials. They 
interpret energy to be a proxy for pollution, strictly valid only if pollution is fixed per unit of energy. DeMooij 
and Bovenberg (1998) review such estimates and find that eKL=0.5, eKZ=0.5, and eLZ=0.3 best summarize the 
existing literature. These figures suggest that capital might be a slightly better substitute for energy than is 
labor, but the difference is not precisely estimated. Their estimates are taken from data on Western European 
countries. 
33
 The table does not contain every permutation of eKZ and eLZ between —1 and 1, because not all permutations 
are possible. Both cannot be negative, since we know that at most one of the three cross-price elasticities is 
negative. Furthermore, we omit combinations that result in a positive value for any eii. Finally, Table 2 always 
uses eKL=1. 
34
 Suppose eKZ=−1 and eLZ=3, so that capital and pollution are complements, while labor and pollution are 
strong substitutes. Then ŵ−  =.00195, and labor gains. 
35
 Moreover, given symmetry (eij=eji) this result means either that all three cross-price elasticities (eKL, eKZ, and 
eLZ) are positive or that one is negative and the other two are positive. 
36
 DeMooij and Bovenberg (1998) derive analogous expressions with a fixed input factor or price. 
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